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BILLS AND NOTES-PREsuMPTION OF CONSIDERATIoN-DIRECTION OF VER-
DICT.-MCCORMACK V. WILLIAMS, 95 ATL. (N. J.) 978.-In an action on
a promissory note the defense was lack of consideration to the knowledge
of plaintiff. Plaintiff put notes in and rested. Defendant and two others
testified that there was no consideration. The trial court directed a ver-
dict for defendant. Held, error. Bergen, Black, Heppenheimer, and
Williams, JJ., dissent.
A negotiable note is deemed to have been issued for valuable consid-
eration. N. I. L., Sec. 24. Hence plaintiff got the benefit of a presump-
tion by putting the note in evidence. The lower court refused to give
the same effect to this presumption as to evidence, saying, "There is no
evidence to overcome the proof as made by the defendant." Since the
presumption arose from evidence and since its effect was to make out a
prima facie case for plaintiff, Metropolitans R. Co. v. Powell, 89 Ga. 6o5;
State v. Lee, 69 Conn. 186, the reversal is correct in holding that it is,
in effect, evidence, Williams v. Hasshagen, 166 Cal. 386; In re Cowdry's
Will, 77 Vt. 359; contra, Peters v. Lowe, 24 S. Dak. 6o5; and that there
was a question for the jury. Volguards v. Myers, 25 Cal. App. 5oo. The
court went farther and said, speaking of the testimony offered by defend-
ant, "no matter how strong that evidence, it raised, in effect, a conflict
of testimony; and conflicting testimony is always for the jury." As a
rule the question of whether or not a presumption has been rebutted is for
the jury. Volguards v. Myers, supra. The question of whether or not
evidence has been rebutted is for the jury, but evidence may be so strong
that the court will be justified in directing a verdict. Travelers Ins. Co.
v. Randolph, 78 Fed. 759. It would seem that in such a-case the verdict
might be directed regardless of whether the opposing side had attempted
to make out a case by evidence or by getting the benefit of a presumption.
Williams v. Hasshagen, I66 Cal. 386. But see Citizetes Bank of Tifton v.
Timmons, 84 S. E. (Ga.) 232.
R. C. W.
CHARITIES-BEQUESTS TO PROMOTE SECULARISM-VALDITY.-RE Bow-
MAN; SECULAR SocIE Y LTED v. BOWMAN, 113 L. T. IO95.-Held, that a
gift in trust to promote the principle "that human conduct should be
based upon natural knowledge and not upon supernatural belief, and that
human welfare in this world is the proper end of all thought and action,"
is a valid charity not contrary to public policy.
Early cases frequently assert that "Christianity is part of the common
law." Rex v. Taylor, I Vent. 293; Rex v. Woolston, 2 Stra. 834; Upde-
graph v. Com., II S. & R. (Pa.) 394 (blasphemy). Thus gifts for infidel
or anti-Christian purposes have been held void. Zeiswenn v. James, 63
Pa. St. 465; Briggs v. Hartley, 19 L. J. R. N. S. (Eq.) 416. And a
contract to let rooms for atheist lectures was unenforceable. Cowan v.
Milbourn, (1867) L. R. Q. Exch. 23o. It was doubted whether gifts for
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anti-Trinitarian purposes could be upheld. See Atty. Gen. v. Pearson,
3 Mer. 353. But it has been established that a bequest promotive of
"any doctrine of Christianity" is good. Atty Gen. v. Meeting-House,
3 Gray (Mass.) 58. The rule has been generally laid down that there
must be "nothing hostile to morality, religion, or law." See George v.
Braddock, 45 N. J. Eq. 757; Jones v. Watford, 62 N. J. Eq. 339, 344. But
nothing short 'of a repudiation of Christianity will invalidate. Thornton
v. Howe, 31 Beav. 14; Vidal v. Philadelphia, 2 How. (U. S.) 127; see
Miller v. Gable, 2 Den. (N. Y.) 492, 525. The holding of the principal
case, though unique, is undoubtedly cqrrect. C. R. W.
* EQUITY-DLiGENcE-FRAuD.-SMITH V. ROGERS ET AL., 87 S. E. (GA.)
772.-The plaintiff, an invalid woman for years, was the victim of fraud
practiced upon her by her brother-in-law and cousin, who took advantage
of her confidence, illness, and ignorance of business. The brother-in-law
obtained her signature to a deed to half her land, under pretense of seeing
which could write the better hand. The cousin got her to sign a deed to
the other half, under pretense of a lease of the whole tract to him, to
terminate at her option. Held, that the plaintiff was so negligent in the
execution of the instruments, that equity will not aid her by a cancellation
of the deeds; and that the case was properly dismissed on demurrer.
Evans, P. J., and Lumpkin, J., dissenting.
No grounds for the decision are given by the court. From the uncon-
troverted facts the defendants fraudulently deceived, tricked, and misled
the plaintiff into signing the deeds. There is no class of cases where
equity will allow a defrauder to set up negligence of his victim as a
defense to his own fraud. Where there is fraud, equity will look upon
any disability of plaintiff with unusual indulgence. Mclntire v. Pryor, 173
U. S. 38; Carter v. Tice, 120 Ill. 277; Harding v. Randall, 15 Me. 332.
And where one who occupies a confidential relation to another takes
advantage of that relation by fraudulent misrepresentations to procure the
execution of a deed, such deed may be cancelled. White v. White, 89 Ill.
46o; Lyons v. Van Riper, 26 N. J. Eq. 337; Bayne v. Whistler, 4 Alaska
15. Laches cannot be set up as a bar to an action if delay is the result
of fraud. Kelley v. Boettcher, 85 Fed. (Colo.) 55; Wampler v. Wamp-
ler, 3o Gratt. (Va.) 454; Free v. Buckingham, 57 N. H. 95. In no case
will the statute of limitations run until plaintiff has knowledge of the
fraud. Brown v. Norman, 55 Miss. 369; Crowther v. Rowlandson, 27
Cal. 376. The plaintiffs in cases similar to the principal cases have been
held justified in relying on the representations of the supposed lessee, and
failure to investigate, without grounds for suspicion, was held not to con-
stitute laches. Mclntire v. Pryor, and Carter v. Tice, supra. There are
no rights of innocent third parties to consider in the principal case, and
equity had only to deal with the immediate parties. One finds difficulty
in sustaining the conclusion reached.
L. W. B.
JUDGMENT LIENS-PREFERENCE.-HULBERT v. HULBERT ET AL., IOI
N. E. (N. Y.) 7o.-Where a judgment debtor inherited realty from his
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father, so that the liens of the judgment creditors, whose judgments had
been docketed, attached thereto simultaneously on the death of the father,
held, the issuing of an execution on one of the judgments was an unneces-
sary act, and did not give such judgment creditor preference or priority
over the other judgment creditors. Williard Bartlett, C. J., and Cuddeback
and Pound, JJ., dissenting.
At common law a mere judgment created no lien. Shrew v. Jones,
22 Fed. Cas. No. 12818; Mitchell v. Wood, 47 Miss. 231. Judgment liens
are statutory. Previous to the N. Y. Revised Laws of 1913, and under the
"Act concerning judgments and executions" passed the 31st of March,
i8oi, "a judgment lien attaches upon land from the time of filing the
record of judgment." Under the Act of i8oi, though not expressly stated,
judgments were considered liens upon real estate, and the language of
the act necessarily implied as much. Under this act, the judgment creditor
first taking proceedings by way of execution gained a priority over the
others, entitling him to prior satisfaction. Adams v. Dyer, 8 Johns. (N. Y.)
347; Waterman v. Haskin, ii Johns. (N. Y.) 228. This rule .has been
followed in other jurisdictions. Rockhill v/. Hanna, 15 How. (U. S.) 189;
Freeman on Executions, Vol. I, 2d Ed. § 2o3; Rorer on Judicial Sales,
§ 826. The Revised Laws of 1813 expressly state that a "judgment shall
be a lien on lands, etc." This is nothing more than was necessarily
implied in the Act of i8oi. This statute (1813) can furnish no grounds
for a distinction between the two earlier cases and the principal case.
Execution was necessary to gain priority under the Act of i8oi, and gave
priority. The principal case cannot be distinguished from the two leading
cases (supra) decided under the Act of i8oi. Apparently New York has
overruled precedents and reversed itself on this point.
E. J. M.
LANDLORD AND TENANT-LEASES-CNSTRUCTION.-PHELPS V. JOHNSON,
18i S. W. (Texas Civ. Ap.) 862. A lease contract, after providing in
detail for rents, etc., declared that, should the lessors sell the land, the
lease should immediately become void. The lease was for a term of five
years and the premises were sold during the last year of the term.-Held,
that when the tenant entered upon the last year, his right to a continua-
tion of possession for that year became vested. Levy, J., dissenting.
The court bases its decision to a great extent on the rule of construc-
tion stated in Cyc and quoted by the court in its opinion. "The court will
endeavor to give a construction most equitable to the parties and which
will not give one of them an unfair or unreasonable advantage over the
other. Thus where the meaning is doubtful, the construction will be
avoided which will entail a forfeiture." 9 Cyc 587. Yet on the same page
Cyc continues: "It is not the province of a court, however, to change the
terms of a contract which has been entered into even though it may be a
harsh and unreasonable one." And later, "Words are to be interpreted
in the ordinary and popular sense." 24 Cyc 915. Argumentatively, the
majority contend that a strict interpretation of the provision would work
a hardship as the landlord might sell in mid-summer and the tenant would
lose the labor expended upon crops if the lease became void immediately
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and he must give up possession forthwith. But this objection 
is unfounded.
A tenant is entitled to crops where his estate is terminated by 
act of God
or of another without his fault. i Tiffany 524. And where 
the term is
uncertain, the tenant who sows is entitled to reap the crop. 
Heavilon v.
Farmer's Bank, 81 Ind. 249; Pfanner v. Sturmer, 40 How. Prac. 
4oi. The
courts have frequently held that if so stipulated in the lease, 
a tenancy
might terminate with the sale of the land. Hickox v. Sugzer, 123 Wis.
128; Jones v. Shibley, i66 S. W. (Ark.) 937; Shaw v. Appleton, 
i61 Mass.
313. The tenancy will end at once and before the 
end of the year. Taylor
v. Froback, 85 Ill. 584; Szpakowski v. Buwoy, 166 App. Div. (N. Y.) 578.
The principal case apparently overrules Thompson v. Oates, 
46 Texas
Civ. App. 383. A contrary conclusion could well have been reached.
A. S. B.
Lis PENDENs-A:PLCAATION TO PERSoNALTY.-MABEE v. MABEE, 
96 Am.
(N. J. EQ.) 495-A wife, in a suit against her husband, 
who was her
debtor, for a legacy left him by his father, was interfered 
with, in her
claims, by an attaching creditor of the husband's interest 
in the estate.
Held, a lUs pendens was created by her filing of the bill: The 
English rule,
that the doctrine of lis pendens is inapplicable to personal 
property other
than chattel interests in land, probably not being the rule in 
the United
States.
The general doctrine of lis pendens has been stated as follows: 
During
the pendency of an equitable suit, neither party to the 
litigation can
alienate the property in dispute, so as to affect the rights of 
the opponent.
Pomeroy-Equity, Sec. 633; Norris v. Ile, 152 Ill. i9o. The 
doctrine has
always been applied to real property without question. Warren 
County v.
Marcy, 97 U. S. 96. But whether it is to apply to personalty 
is a matter
of great conflict. Pomeroy (op. cit., Sec. 636), without citing any 
authority,
dogmatically asserts that the doctrine has no application to personal 
prop-
erty, except when there is a trust extending over the personalty. 
I or
arguments against its application to personalty, see 21 Am. 
and Eng.
Encyc. 627. Stocks, bonds and other negotiable instruments transferred
before maturity are held not subject to lis pendens for their 
circulation
must not be impeded. Secor v. Witter, 39 Ohio St. 218; Mayberry 
v.
Morris, 62 Ala. 113. This is substantially the English doctrine, 
except
that English courts hold chattel interests in land subject to lis 
pendens,
as stated by Lindley, L. J., in Wigram v. Buckley (1894) 3 Ch. 
493. But
Pomeroy's position is strongly opposed by many, i Freeman-Judgments
(4 ed.), Sec. 194, cited in Osborn v. Glasscock, 39 W. 
Va. 749, on the
ground that the danger of defeating judgments or decrees by 
a transfer
of the subject-matter is much greater in the case of movable 
than im-
movable property. See also Burnham v. Smith, 82 Mo. App. 35. 
The
authorities are hopelessly in conflict. Reid v. Sheffy, 75 Ill. 
App. 136;
Miles v. Lefi, 6o Iowa, i68. Where the statutes have spoken on the subject,
they'have in nearly every case concerned themselves with real 
property
only. The statement in the principal case represents as well as 
any the
American holdings, having regard both to the numerical weight 
of
authority and the probable trend of the decisions. A. N. H.
RECENT CASES
MARRIAGE-BREACH OF PROmisE-SuRvIVAL OF ACTION AGAINST EXECUTOR
OF PRomISoR-SpEcIAL DAMAG.-QUIRK v. THOMAs, CT. OF Apr., i4o L. T.
(ENG.) 131.-Where the plaintiff, relying on the promise of marriage by
the executor's testator, gave up a profitable business, thereby suffering
financial loss through the breach of promise, held, that there could be no
recovery, the court expressing its doubts as to whether or not the action
would lie, even if special damage had been proven.
As a general proposition, an action for breach of promise of marriage
does not survive at common law as it is purely personal. Hayden v.
Vreeland, 37 N. J. L. 372. Some courts, however, intimate that the action
survives if special damage is proven. Larocque v. Conheim, 87 N. Y. S.
625; Grubb v. Sult, 32 Gratt. (Va.) 2o3; Smith v. Sherman, 4 Cush.
(Mass.) 4o8. The allegation of special damage must relate to property
and be such as would be sufficient of itself to maintain a suit. Hovey v.
Page, 55 Me. 142; Jenkins v. French, 58 N. H. 532. So where the primary
cause of the injury is personal, although with resultant damage to the
party's estate, which latter would not of itself be a ground for action,
the action does not survive. Drake v. Beckman, ii Me. & Wel. 316;
Vittum v. Gilman, 48 N. H. 419; Payne's Appeal, 65 Conn. 379. In clas-
sifying the action for breach of promise, it resembles an action on the case
for personal injuries, being sui generis, as it cannot be classed as a pure
action ex contractu, as distinguished from one purely ex delicto, or
vice versa. Wade v. Klabfleisch, 58 N. Y. 282. Regarding the action as
being one of deceit, as there is a resemblance (Stebbins v. Palmer, I Pick.
(Mass.) 7), it would not survive unless the estate of the testator was
enriched thereby, Jones v. Van Zandt, 4 McLean 599, Fed. Cas. No. 7, 503.
Thus there was created no quasi contract. Phillips v. Homfray, L. R. 24,
Ch. D. 439. However, the states of New Hampshire and North Carolina
have made statutory provision for the survival of the same. Stewart v.
Lee, 7o N. H. 181; Shuler v. Millsap, 71 N. C. 297. In view of the
unsettled state of the authorities regarding the survival of a breach of
promise action, in the absence of statutory enactment, no definite rule
can be laid down. However, it may be stated as a settled doctrine that
where the injury to property is incidental to the personal injury, it does
not survive. In the principal case the loss grew out of the broken promise,
as appears, and therefore it should die with the transgressor, as his estate
was not enriched and the primary cause of the action was the personal
injury.
J. McD.
SALE OF STANDING TIMBER-CONSTRUcTION OF CONTRACT. CHAPMAN V.
DEARMAN Er AL., I81 S. W. (TEx.) 8o8.-Held, that a warranty deed to all
timber standing and growing upon a described tract of land, no mention
being made in deed as to time of removal, c6nveyed a fee simple to the
timber, and the grantee was under no obligation to remove the same within
a reasonable time. Middlebrook, J., dissenting.
It has been held that such a grant does not convey the title in fee
simple, but gives the grantee the beneficial interest only, until the timber
shall be cut and removed,-a terminable estate, which ends when a reason-
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able time, after the execution of the deed, for the removal of such timber
has expired. Fletcher v. Lyon, 93 Ark. 5; McNair & Wade Land Co. v.
Parker, 59 So. (Fla.) 959; Carson v. Three States Lumber So., lo8 Tenn.
681. Mississippi agrees with the principal case. Butterfield Lumber Co.
v. Guy, 46 So. (Miss.) 78. Where the parties use words from which it is
inferable that a reasonable time was meant, such construction will control.
Houston Oil Co. of Texas v. Boykin, I53 S. W. (Tex.) 1176, where the
phrase "to remove as shall be convenient!' was construed to mean within
a reasonable time. It would seem that parol evidence should have been
admitted in the principal case, not to vary, but to explain the terms of
the deed, to show the intention of the parties. McNair & Wade Land Co.
v. Adams, 54 Fla., 550; McRae v. Stillwell, iii Ga. 65. The principal case
is clearly contrary to the great weight of authority. E. J. M.
TAXATION-DELEGATION OF POWER-CORPORATE AUTHoRITIEs.-LALLARD
v. MELTON ET AL., 87 S. E. (S. C.) 42.-Held, that a statute enacted by
the legislature creating a commission to carry out the work of improving
highways in a county, and authorizing the issuance of bonds by such
commission for that purpose within a limit, and to levy certain taxes to
meet these bonds, is not unconstitutional in that it vests taxing power in
persons other than corporate authorities. Seven dissents.
The court in the principal case is unanimous in holding that there was
a delegation of the taxing power, but they are divided seven to eight upon
the question as to who constitute "corporate authorities" within that
provision of the constitution which -provides that "Corporate authorities
of counties, townships, school districts, cities, towns, and villages may be
vested with power to assess and collect taxes for corporate purposes."
The majority followed the rule laid down in a long line of Illinois cases
that corporate authorities must mean those municipal officers who are
directly elected by the people, or appointed in some mode to which the
people have given their consent. Cornell v. People, io7 Ill. 372. And the
consent of the people to the election of these officers may be given by a
vote upon the statute providing for their appointment. The officers so
appointed become corporate authorities, and may exercise the taxing power
when delegated to them. 4 Dillon Municipal Corps. sec. 1372; People v.
Knopf, 171 Ill. 191. 2 Words and Phrases, 16o2. However, there are
courts which maintain that, inasmuch as taxation is a legislative act, "cor-
porate authorities" in this connection refers to those officers to whom is
given the ordinance-making power. State v. Andrews, ii Neb. 524;
Howe v. Des Moines, lO3 Iowa 76. The still more strict view is held by the
Kansas court that the officers must be directly elected by the people.
Parks v. Board of Com'rs, 61 Fed. (Kan.) 437. C.
THEATERS-DRAdATIC CRIrcs-CIvIL RIGHTS BILL.----WooLLCoTT v. SHU-
BERT, NEW YoRK LAW JoURNAL (CT. APLS.), FE. 29, 19i6.-The dramatic
critic of a newspaper was refused admittance to a theater by the pro-
prietors because of a displeasing comment upon one of their productions.
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Held, the proprietors were within their common law rights, the state civil
rights bill having reference only to discrimination on account of race, creed
or color.
It is well settled that theatres are private enterprises, under the control
of private parties and that they may license whomsoever they will to enter,
and refuse admission to whomsoever they will. Meisner v. Detroit Ferry
Co., 154 Mich. 548; Purcell v. Daly, 19 Abb. N. Cas. (N. Y.) 301; Luxen-
berg v. Keith Co., 117 N. Y. S. 979. Since theaters exist wholly under
the authority and protection of state laws, it is competent for the state
to impose the condition that the proprietors shall admit and accommodate
all persons impartially. Cooley-Torts, Vol. II, p. 613. This is a legiti-
mate exercise of its police power. Mayor v. Eden Musie Co., lO2 N. Y.
593; People v. Steele, 231 Ill. 34o. An instance of state regulation which
has been held to be within a state's police power is presented in Greenberg
v. Western Turf Ass'n., 14o Cal. 357, where a statute held unlawful the
refusal of admission of any adult presenting a ticket to any place of
public amusement. In the absence of like statutes under the police power,
the only qualification in the law as to the absolute right of exclusion is
that established by the state Civil Rights Bill; and the principal case is
clearly correct in holding that this act refers only to discriminations
because of race, creed or color. In the absence, then, of any statute, which
is admittedly within the police power of the state, the holding of the
instant case is correct on legal principle, however open to criticism it may
be on ethical or aesthetic grounds.
A. N. H.
ToRTs-INTERFERFNcE WITH CONTRACT RELATIONS-KNOWLEDGE AS ELE-
MENT OF MALIcE.-TwITcHELL v. NELSON ET AL., 155 N. W. (MiNN.) 621.-
In an action for inducing a breach of contract, by a third person, held, that
the essential element of malice may be supplied by facts which should
have put the defendant upon inquiry, amounting to legal "notice" of the
contract, irrespective of whether he was actually aware of the contract or
not.
In the case of a purchase for value of a legal interest to which there
are outstanding equities, it is settled that "notice" in law may consist,
not in knowledge of the equities themselves, but in knowledge of facts
which should have put the purchaser upon inquiry such as would have
led to a discovery of the equities. Kyle v. Ward, 8i Ala. i2o. An excep-
tion is generally recognized in the case of negotiable paper, where actual
"bad faith" must be shown. Murray v. Lardner, 2 Wall. (U. S.) 11o. In
the principal case even the term "bad faith" is extended fictitiously to
apply to all cases of legal "notice." Compare cases of deceit in which
legal "notice" in the above sense is held sufficient, without an actual
deceptive state of mind. Gordon v. Irwine, 1O5 Ga. 144; Davidson v.
Jordan, 47 Cal. 353. Contra, Nash v. Ins. & Trust Co., 163 Mass. 574;
Kountze v. Kennedy, 147 N. Y. x24; Warfield v. Clark, In8 Iowa 69; and
the cases generally. For an extreme case see Donald v. Ain. Smelting
Co., 62 N. 3. Eq. 729 ("actual fraud" extended to exercise of honest
judgment without due examination of facts). In extending the sane
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fictitious use of language to cases of express malice, the principal case
departs from a uniform course of the authorities, all of whom require,
in torts involving malice, the intentional infliction of injury upon another.
Beekman v. Marsten, 195 Mass. 205, 212; Mfg. Co. v. DeWitt, i2o Md.
381; Joyce v. Ry. Co., ioo Minn. 225; Schonwald v. Ragains, 32 Okl. 223.
C. R. W.
WAR-TRADING WITH THE ENEMY-CIVILIAN PRISONER OF WAR-INTERN-
MENT OF ALIEN ENEMY WITHIN REAL -- DEPRIVATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS.-
SCHAFFENIUS V. GOLDBERG, 113 L. T. (ENG.) 949.-Held, that the restraint
imposed on the movements of an alien enemy by his internment does not
make him an alien ex lege, thus depriving him of the civil rights he
possessed theretofore.
On the breaking out of war, neutrals and the citizens of the opposing
belligerent country are generally allowed a reasonable time to withdraw.
The Sarah Starr, Blatch. Pr. Ca. 65o. This provision has also been inserted
in many treaties between countries. At once there is an entire cessation
of all commercial intercourse with the opposing hostile country, except in
case of cominercia belli, unless by permission of the sovereign power.
Esposito v. Bowden, (1857) 7 E. & B. 762; The Hoop, I Rob. Rep. Adm.
196. However, permission may be given to the subjects of the enemy
to remain, and if given, they may enjoy their property. West. Int. Law.
Vol. II, p. 42. In the enforcement of his civil rights such an alien
enemy is treated as if a subject of the country in which he is, notwith-
standing that at the same time he is the subject of an enemy, but he
cannot enforce his rights for the benefit of the enemy. Janson v. Dreifon-
stein Cons. Mines, (19o2) Appeal Cases, H. L. 4
84. The test is not a
person's nationality, but his place of business.' McConnell v. Hector, 3 B.
& P. 113. If the alien enemy is residing in his own country his right to
sue in the courts of the opposing country is suspended, by the latter, dur-
ing the war. Howes, Hyatt & Co. v. Chester & Co., 33 Ga. 89; Bell v.
Chapman, io Johns. 183; Wilcox v. Henry, I U. S. (Dallas) 69. But if he
is sued he may avail himself of all means and appliances of defense.
McVeigh v. U. S., ii Wall. 259; Albrecht v. Sussman, 2 V. & B. 322. An
alien enemy residing in the United States by permission is competent to
maintain a personal action. Otteridge v. Thompson, Fed. Cas. No. IO,
618; Clarke v. Morey, IO Johns. 69; and the same is held in England
regarding alien enemies residing there. Sparenburgh v. Bannatyne, I B. &
P. 163. So it was held that an alien who had complied with the Aliens
Restriction Act, 1914, 4 & 5 Geo. 5 c. 12, might have access to the courts.
Princess Thurn & Taxis v. Moffitt, (1915) I Ch. 58. Accordingly the
principal case rightly holds that as long as he is permitted to remain in
England with the permission of the Crown he is under its protection and
should be permitted to exercise his civil rights. His internment cannot
of itself be considered to have abridged them by implication, inasmuch as
there was no express enactment to that effect.
J. McD.
